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Abstract
Five leading German political parties and their coalitions are evaluated with regard to
party manifestos and results of the 2005 parliamentary elections. For this purpose, the
party manifestos are converted into Yes/No answers to 95 topical questions (Relax the
protection against dismissals? Close nuclear power plants? etc.). On each question,
every party represents its adherents as well as those of the parties with the same position.
Therefore, a party usually represents a larger group than its direct adherents.
The popularity of a party is understood to be the percentage of the electorate repre-
sented, averaged on all the 95 questions. The universality of a party is the frequency of
representing a majority of electors. The questions are considered either unweighted, or
weighted by an expert, or weighted by the number of GOOGLE-results for given keywords
(the more important the question, the more documents in the Internet). The weighting
however plays a negligible role because the party answers are backed up by the party
“ideology” which determines a high intra-question correlations.
The SPD (Social-Democratic Party) did not receive the highest percentage of votes,
remains nevertheless the most popular and the most universal German party. A compar-
ison of the election results with the position of German Trade Union Federation (DGB)
reveals its high representativeness as well.
Finally, all coalitions with two and three parties are also evaluated. The coali-
tion CDU/SPD (which is currently in power) is the most popular, and the coalition
SPD/Green/Left-Party (which failed due to personal conflicts) is the most universal.
Keywords: Parliamentary election, fractions, coalitions, theory of voting, mathe-
matical theory of democracy, indices of popularity and universality, German Trade Union
Federation (DGB).
JEL Classification: D71
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1 Introduction
The result of German parliamentary elections 2005 (Bundestag 2005, Bundeswahl-
leiter 2005, Sueddeutsche 2005; see the “second votes” devoted to parties)
SPD CDU/CSU Green FDP Left-Party 19 minor parties
Percentage of votes 34.2 35.2 8.1 9.8 8.7 4.0
is difficult to judge, because no party got an absolute majority of votes1. It is known that
the bottle-necks of simple majority voting systems are so drastic that the legitimacy of
election results can be put in question (Held 1996, Samons 2004).
Already in 1770, the member of the Royal Academy of Sciences in Paris J.-Ch. de
Borda (1733–1799) warned against “wrong results” of simple majority vote for more than
two parties (Black 1958). Borda has illustrated it with an example of three candidates
A,B,C and 21 voters, see Figure 1. The winner is the candidate A who receives 8 votes.
On the other hand, A is the most undesired for an absolute majority of 13 of 21 voters.
Preference
direction
Voters
6 6 6
A
B
C
8
B
C
A
7
C
B
A
6
Figure 1: Example of Borda (1770, see Black 1958, p. 157)
In similar cases, more information than just the first choices should be considered:
candidate rankings (preferences of electors with second and third priorities), preference
grades, quantitative estimations, etc. Such problems are studied in the theory of voting
and social choice since the 18 century, however, with no unambiguous solution (Mueller
1989). Therefore, to attain a social consensus, each particular situation should be ana-
lyzed from several sides.
The given paper evaluates the five leading political parties in the German parlia-
mentary elections on September 18 and in Dresden on October 2, 2005, following the
mathematical model of democracy (Tangian 1991–2005). The data required for the
application are similar to that used by the Internet program Wahl-O-Mat (2005): a
1SPD is the Social Democratic Party, CDU is the Christian Democratic Union together with Bavaria’s
Christian Social Union (conservators), FDP is the Free Democratic Party (neoliberals), and Left-Party is
a fusion of the PDS (Party of Democratic Socialism—former East German communists) with the WASG
(Voting Alternative for Employment and Social Justice—the separated left wing of the SPD).
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tabular representation of party positions and individual opinions in the form of Yes/No
answers to topical questions (Relax the protection against dismissals? Yes/No; Close
nuclear power plants? Yes/No, etc.). The task of the mathematical model of democ-
racy is different, however. The program Wahl-O-Mat helps the individual user to find
the party to vote for (the program was originally aimed at involving young people into
political participation). The mathematical model of democracy estimates how good the
parties represent the whole of electorate. In other words, the Wahl-O-Mat tests the
goodness of fit of single voters to parties, and the mathematical model of democracy tests
the goodness of fit of parties to the electorate.
The parties are evaluated with indicators of popularity and universality. The indicators
can be regarded as two global social utility functions which reflect the ability of parties
and their coalitions to represent the electorate. The indicators are derived from the
size of groups resulting from crosscutting cleavages (Pitkin 1967, Miller 1964, Wright
1978, Miller 1983, and Brams et al. 1998). In a sense, both indicators suggest a kind
of correlation measure for estimating the proximity between party positions and voters’
opinions introduced into political science by Achen (1977, 1978).
The crosscutting cleavages are determined by 95 dichotomous questions2 (with Yes/No
answers), each dividing the society into two groups, one with positive, and one with
negative opinion on the question. The parties, answering these questions, represent some
Yes-groups and some No-groups. The popularity of a party is measured by the size of
the group represented, averaged on the 95 questions selected. The universality of a party
is the frequency of representing a majority. Therefore, the popularity reflects the spatial
aspect of representativeness, and the universality reflects its temporal aspect.
The questions are considered either unweighted, or weighted by an expert, or weighted
by the number of GOOGLE-results for given keywords (the more important the question,
the more documents in the Internet). It turns out that the weighting plays a negligible
role. The party answers backed up by the party “ideology” are highly correlated, making
the overall evaluation little sensitive to question weights.
The quantitative analysis shows that the SPD is the most popular and the most
universal German party, although it did not receive the highest percentage of votes. A
comparison of the election results with the position of German Trade Union Federation
(DGB) reveals its high representativeness as well. Finally, all coalitions with two and
three parties are also evaluated. The coalition CDU/SPD (which is actually in power) is
2The same number as of the Theses by Martin Luther (1517).
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the most popular, and the coalition SPD/Green/Left-Party (which failed due to personal
conflicts) is the most universal.
In Section 2, “Model”, initial data, basic assumptions, and indicators of popularity
and universality of parties are introduced. In particular, all the 95 source questions with
party answers and weightings are listed.
In Section 3, “Evaluation of parties”, the indices of popularity and universality of
parties and of DGB are discussed, both for the whole of Germany and for federal states
(La¨nder). The main conclusion is that the SPD has better indicators, although the CDU
got the highest percentage of votes.
In Section 4, “Evaluation of coalitions”, a kind of coalition formation analysis is per-
formed; for recent references see van Deemen (1997) and de Vries (1999). For this purpose,
the indices of popularity and universality are extended to coalitions with two and three
parties. The main conclusion is that the coalition of three left parties could be a better
alternative to the centrist coalition currently in power.
In Section 5, “Summary”, the main statements of the paper are recapitulated.
In Section 6, “Computational issues”, the mathematical model is rigorously described.
The computation formulas are derived and linked to tables and figures of the paper.
Section 7, “Proofs”, contains demonstrations to two theorems of the paper.
2 Model
Journalists Anne Graef (Einblick, DGB, Berlin) and Michael Schultheiss (Hannover) have
analyzed comparative tables of party manifestos downloadable from the Internet like (Ge-
werkschaft der Polizei Bremen 2005, Werner et al. 2005) and published in
popular journals. The distinctions in the form of Yes/No answers to 95 questions are
collected in Table 1. The position of the German Federation of Trade Unions (DGB) has
been specified by Anne Graef and Michael Schultheiss.
The unequal importance of the questions can be reflected by weight coefficients. Such
a weighting (with grades 1–5) performed by Anne Graef as a DGB-expert is shown in
the next to last column of Table 1. The last column of Table 1 contains the number
of GOOGLE-results for given (German) keywords on September 25, 2005. The idea of
using GOOGLE as a weighting instrument is as follows: the more important the question,
the more frequently it is discussed, and the more documents in the Internet contain the
related keywords.
It is assumed that the opinions of voters on all the 95 questions are represented by their
9
Table 1: Structuralized representation of party manifestos
Opinions of parties and unions Weighting
SPD CDU Green FDP Left-Party Unions Expert Google results
34.2% 35.2% 8.1% 9.8% 8.7% 18.09.05 25.09.05
Labour market
Relax the protection against dismissals No Yes No Yes No No 5 25300
Sector-dependent minimal wages Yes No Yes No No Yes 4 367
Statutory minimal wage Yes No Yes No Yes Yes 3 32500
Prolong Unemployment Benefits I (ALG I) for old employees Yes No Yes No Yes Yes 5 32700
Equalize Unemployment Benefits II (ALG II) in East and West Yes No Yes No Yes Yes 5 65900
Increase Unemployment Benefits II No No Yes No Yes Yes 5 23500
Unemployment Benefits II: higher allowance for old-age provisions No No Yes No Yes Yes 5 14900
Cancel Hartz IV No No No No Yes No 4 25700
Increase the limit for mini-jobs up to 600 EUR No No No Yes No No 5 41
Adopt combined wages No Yes No No No No 3 54000
Statutory subsidies to low-paid No No Yes No No Yes 3 604
Abolish the Federal Employment Office No No No Yes No No 5 32000
Further subsidize self-employment (Ich-AGs) Yes No No No No No 4 24600
Narrow rights of employees No Yes No Yes No No 5 20100
Broaden laws for foreign workers Yes No Yes No Yes Yes 5 407
Efficient protection against dismissals also in small enterprizes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes 5 30000
Unemployment Benefits II: reconsideration of partner’s income No No Yes No Yes Yes 5 548
Simplifying temporary employment No Yes No Yes No No 5 9180
More actively subsidize the labour market Yes No Yes No Yes Yes 5 40900
Co-determination
Restrict the establishment of works councils No No No Yes No No 5 35900
Cancel the parity co-determination No No No Yes No No 5 27300
Pacts for employment and competitiveness No Yes No Yes No No 5 120000
Reduce the autonomy of collective bargaining No Yes No Yes No No 5 12400
Reduce the influence of trade unions No Yes No Yes No No 5 34100
Abolish generally binding collective agreements No Yes No Yes No No 5 980
Retain area collective agreements Yes No Yes No Yes Yes 5 34600
Trade union representatives in supervisory boards Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 5 712
Economy
Reduce the corporation tax Yes Yes No Yes No No 3 359000
Deregulate employment, health, and environment protection No Yes No Yes No No 5 770000
More favorable credits for medium-sized business Yes Yes No Yes No No 3 472000
More generous financing of research Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 3 289000
Better control of hedge funds Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 4 57400
Disclose the income of firms’ directors Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 4 156000
Increase public investments Yes No No No Yes Yes 5 454000
No further reduction of statutory social responsibility Yes No No Yes No Yes 5 60100
Privatization of state investments No No No Yes No No 4 56300
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Table 1: (Continued) Structuralized representation of party manifestos
Opinions of parties and unions Weighting
SPD CDU Green FDP Left-Party Unions Expert Google results
34.2% 35.2% 8.1% 9.8% 8.7% 18.09.05 25.09.05
Taxes
Increase the value added tax (VAT) No Yes No No No No 5 37400
Abolish trade income tax No No No Yes No No 5 29800
Reduce the highest tax rate No Yes No Yes No No 4 57800
Increase the highest tax rate No No Yes No Yes Yes 4 44300
Tax-free surcharges for work on weekends and at night No Yes No Yes No No 5 10200
Cut flat-rate benefits for commuter travels No Yes Yes Yes No No 5 32400
Tax on assets No No Yes No Yes Yes 5 220000
Increase the inheritance tax for large heritages No No Yes No Yes Yes 4 610
”Richness-tax” for high income Yes No Yes No Yes Yes 5 54000
Tax on realization of shares in joint-stock companies No Yes No Yes Yes Yes 4 561
Health and pensions
Account the income from capital Yes No Yes No Yes Yes 5 519
Compulsory health insurance for all employed Yes No Yes No Yes Yes 5 743000
Equal contribution for all insured No Yes No No No No 5 226000
Abolish the compulsory health insurance No No No Yes No No 5 968000
Obligatory basic insurance at private health insurance No No No Yes No No 5 203
Strengthen private old-age provisions Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 4 94600
Prolong the duration of working life Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 3 37500
Obligatory insurance for pensions No No Yes No Yes Yes 4 1
Basic income No No No Yes No No 5 652
Gender
Anti-discrimination law Yes No Yes No No Yes 5 316000
Equal-opportunity law for private firms No No Yes No Yes Yes 5 13300
Reform the splitting of income between spouses No No Yes No Yes Yes 3 646
Family
More general right to part-time work Yes No Yes No Yes Yes 5 526
One-year parental benefits as wage substitute Yes No Yes No Yes Yes 5 152
Right to the parental leave for children under three years Yes No Yes No Yes Yes 4 12800
Child-bonus 50 EUR to the pension insurance No Yes No No No No 3 12600
Education
Tuition fees for the first course of study No Yes No Yes No No 4 102000
Abolish the school system with three school types No No Yes No Yes No 2 608
Statutory apportionment of trainee positions No No Yes No Yes Yes 5 1740
Strengthen / subsidize professional training Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 4 198000
Establishing the all-day school Yes No Yes No Yes Yes 5 91500
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Table 1: (Continued) Structuralized representation of party manifestos
Opinions of parties and unions Weighting
SPD CDU Green FDP Left-Party Unions Expert Google results
34.2% 35.2% 8.1% 9.8% 8.7% 18.09.05 25.09.05
East Germany
Some exceptions from federal laws No Yes No Yes No No 5 21000
Subsidize households Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 3 313
Energy and environment
Longer terms for nuclear power plants No Yes No Yes No No 4 9910
Subsidize renewable energy Yes No Yes No Yes Yes 3 212000
Subsidize black coal industry Yes No No No Yes Yes 4 46800
Continue the agriculture reform Yes No Yes No Yes Yes 3 568
Restrict genetic technologies Yes No Yes No Yes Yes 3 133000
Introduce the environmental code Yes No Yes No No Yes 3 18700
Abolish the can pledge No No No Yes No No 1 12300
Speed limit on motor ways No No Yes No Yes No 1 50500
Domestic policy
Use army forces in domestic problems No Yes No Yes No No 3 46800
Abolish large bugging operations No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 2 606
Abolish the access of public authorities to bank accounts No No No Yes No No 3 215
Sharpen the immigration restrictions No Yes No No No No 4 62
Allow double nationality No No Yes No Yes Yes 4 107000
People’s participation at the national level No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 3 17000
Improve labelling of foodstuffs Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 1 39000
Culture as the national objective i+A8n the Basic Law Yes No Yes Yes No Yes 1 19700
Foreign affairs
Abolish the compulsory military service No No Yes Yes Yes No 2 38100
NATO is the most important security pact No Yes No Yes No No 3 37
Withdraw nuclear weapons from Germany No No No No Yes No 3 29200
Increase the development aid for other countries Yes No Yes No Yes Yes 3 104000
European politics
Accept Turkey as the EU member state Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 4 51400
Strictly respect the stability pact No Yes No Yes No No 5 853
Reconsider the EU-constitution No No No Yes Yes No 5 548
Develop the European joint defense policy Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 3 28200
Liberalize the Single European Market for services No Yes No Yes No No 5 35000
Strengthen the social dimension of the EU Yes No Yes No Yes Yes 5 144000
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favorite parties. It would be certainly better to use individual answers to each question
but such data are not available.
Each party, as well as the DGB has its own Yes/No answer to each question. By voting
for a Yes-party or for a No-Party (for a given question), the voters build two groups: Yes-
group and No-Group. The representativeness of a Yes-Party for a given question is the
size of the whole Yes-Group. Respectively, the representativeness of a No-Party for a
given question is the size of the whole No-Group; see Figure 2.
For example, consider the first question “Relax the protection against dismissals?”.
The SPD, Green, and Left-Party are against this measure, having the representativeness
34.2 + 8.1 + 8.7 = 51%, that is, representing 51% of voters. This No-group is shown in
Figure 2 by red, green, and dark-red rectangles3 (with the lengths being the percentage
of votes received by each party). These rectangles lie in the No-Domain to the left from
the vertical axis 0%. CDU and FDP will relax the protection against dismissals and
represent thereby 35.2 + 9.8 = 45.0% of the electorate. This Yes-group is shown by black
and yellow rectangles. It lies in the Yes-Domain to the right from the vertical axis. The
sum of both groups is always 96%. The more the No-Group overbalances, the more the
total 96%-rectangle is shifted to the left. The more the Yes-Group overbalances, the more
it is shifted to the right.
On each question, every party represents its adherents as well as those of the parties
with the same position. For example, the SPD’s representativeness is 51% on the first
question, 44.2% on the second question, etc., although it obtained only 34.2% votes. This
means that a party usually represents a larger group than its direct adherents.
The average percentage of the voters represented is understood to be the popularity of
the party. For example, the computed popularity of the SPD is 67.5%, almost twice the
percentage of its direct adherents.
The frequency of representing a majority (≥ 50%) is called the universality of the
party. For instance, the SPD represents a majority on 86 of 95 questions. This provides
86
95
· 100% = 90.5% universality.
The indices of popularity and universality can be computed directly (unweighted), or
with weight coefficients of the questions. Then the popularity is defined to be the weighted
average representativeness, and the universality is defined to be the weighted frequency
of representing a majority; for details see Section 6.
3Throughout the paper, the official colors of the five parties are used. The DGB’s inofficial color is
red, but we use blue to distinct the DGB from the “red” parties.
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Figure 2: What do the voters give their votes for?
100% 50% 0% 50% 100%
Tax on realization of shares in joint−stock companies
"Richness−tax" for high income
Increase the inheritance tax for large heritages
Tax on assets
Cut flat−rate benefits for commuter travels
Tax−free surcharges for work on weekends and at night
Increase the highest tax rate
Reduce the highest tax rate
Abolish trade income tax
Increase the value added tax (VAT)
Privatization of state investments
No further reduction of statutory social responsibility
Increase public investments
Disclose the income of firms’ directors
Better control of hedge funds
More generous financing of research
More favorable credits for medium−sized business
Deregulate employment, health, and environment protection
Reduce the corporation tax
Trade union representatives in supervisory boards
Retain area collective agreements
Abolish generally binding collective agreements
Reduce the influence of trade unions
Reduce the autonomy of collective bargaining
Pacts for employment and competitiveness
Cancel the parity co−determination
Restrict the establishment of works councils
More actively subsidize the labour market
Simplifying temporary employment
Unemployment Benefits II: reconsideration of partner’s income
Efficient protection against dismissals also in small enterprizes
Broaden laws for foreign workers
Narrow rights of employees
Further subsidize self−employment (Ich−AGs)
Abolish the Federal Employment Office
Statutory subsidies to low−paid
Adopt combined wages
Increase the limit for mini−jobs up to 600 EUR
Cancel Hartz IV
Unemployment Benefits II: higher allowance for old−age provisions
Increase Unemployment Benefits II 
Equalize Unemployment Benefits II (ALG II) in East and West 
Prolong Unemployment Benefits I (ALG I) for old employees
Statutory minimal wage
Sector−dependent minimal wages
Relax the protection against dismissals 
    
    
. Position of unions (DGB)      , Left−Party      , FDP      , Green                 , CDU                SPD 
Percentage of voters, who with YES/NO to the questions of party manifestos answer: by voting for the
NO YES
Labour market
Co−determination
Economy
Taxes
Percentage of NO/YES votes
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Figure 2: (Continued) What do the voters give their votes for?
100% 50% 0% 50% 100%
Strengthen the social dimension of the EU
Liberalize the Single European Market for services
Develop the European joint defense policy
Reconsider the EU−constitution
Strictly respect the stability pact
Accept Turkey as the EU member state
Increase the development aid for other countries
Withdraw nuclear weapons from Germany
NATO is the most important security pact
Abolish the compulsory military service
Culture as the national objective i+A8n the Basic Law
Improve labelling of foodstuffs
People’s participation at the national level
Allow double nationality
Sharpen the immigration restrictions
Abolish the access of public authorities to bank accounts
Abolish large bugging operations
Use army forces in domestic problems
Speed limit on motor ways
Abolish the can pledge
Introduce the environmental code
Restrict genetic technologies
Continue the agriculture reform
Subsidize black coal industry
Subsidize renewable energy
Longer terms for nuclear power plants
Subsidize households
Some exceptions from federal laws
Establishing the all−day school
Strengthen / subsidize professional training 
Statutory apportionment of trainee positions
Abolish the school system with three school types
Tuition fees for the first  course of study
Child−bonus 50 EUR to the pension insurance
Right to the parental leave for children under three years
One−year parental benefits as wage substitute
More general right to part−time work
Reform the splitting of income between spouses
Equal−opportunity law for private firms
Anti−discrimination law
Basic income
Obligatory insurance for pensions
Prolong the duration of working life
Strengthen private old−age provisions
Obligatory basic insurance at private health insurance
Abolish the compulsory health insurance
Equal contribution for all insured
Compulsory health insurance for all employed
                                                            Account the income from capital
    
    
. Position of unions (DGB)      , Left−Party      , FDP      , Green                 , CDU                SPD 
Percentage of voters, who with YES/NO to the questions of party manifestos answer: by voting for the
NO YES
Health and pensions
Gender
Family
Education
East Germany
Energy and environment
Domestic policy
Foreign affairs
European politics
Percentage of NO/YES votes
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3 Evaluation of parties
The popularity and universality of parties and of DGB are displayed in Figure 3. Each
indicators is given in three versions:
• for Unweighted (u) questions,
• for by Anne Graef as Expert (e) weighted questions as well as
• by GOOGLE-results (g) weighted questions.
Which conclusions do follow from Figure 3?
1. In spite of shortage of votes, the SPD remains to be the most popular
and most universal German party
The 67.5% unweighted popularity of the SPD means that on the average it represents
the opinion of 67.5% voters. The unweighted 90.5% universality means that it
represents a majority on 86 of 95 questions.
Note that both indices of the SPD are higher than that of the election winner
CDU. This means that, despite the unfavorable vote ratio, the SPD represents
the electorate better. The shortage of votes is rather due to a disappointment of
citizens by the economic recession and governmental policy than due to the electoral
program.
2. High representativeness of the German Trade Union Federation (DGB)
The high indices of the DGB mean that it well represents the public opinion and
finds a significant support in the society. Note that this conclusion is obtained with
no interrogation of public opinion but indirectly, by comparing the position of the
DGB with the election results.
3. Weighting plays a negligible role in the evaluation
As one can see in Figure 3, the three weighting types of the questions (unweighted,
expert-weighting, and GOOGLE-weighting) has a little influence on the indicators’
values. Indeed, the party answers are backed up by the party “ideology” which
determines a high intra-question correlations. Therefore, under-weighting and even
omitting some questions plays a negligible role, because other questions carry su-
perfluous information on the parties (over-weighting some questions is equivalent to
under-weighting other questions).
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Figure 3: Indicators of popularity and universality of parties and of DGB for unweighted
(u) questions, for by an expert (e) weighted questions and for by GOOGLE-results (g)
weighted questions
SPD:34.2% CDU:35.2% Green:8.1% FDP:9.8% Left−Party:8.7% Unions
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Henceforth, only unweighted indicators will be considered.
Table 2 displays the percentage of votes and unweighted indices of popularity and
universality of the parties and of the DGB for all the 16 German federal states and for
the whole of Germany. Besides, each column of the table is provided with a ranking R of
the federal states with respect to the corresponding indicator.
For example, the SPD is the most popular party in Bremen (74.5%, rank 1), where its
universality 98.9% is also maximal (the SPD represents a majority in 94 of 95 questions).
However, its highest percentage of votes is attained in Niedersachsen with somewhat lower
indices (5th and 3rd rank, respectively).
Both unweighted indicators are depicted in Figures 4 and 5. The CDU surpasses the
SPD in Bavaria, Baden-Wu¨urtemberg and Rheinland-Pfalz. At the party landscape, the
CDU is seen behind the SPD in these three openings only.
The DGB attains its highest popularity in Brandenburg (65.8%) and the highest uni-
versality in Bremen (80%), whereas the CDU has a quite low standing in these federal
states. The DGB is least popular and universal in the conservative Bavaria, where the
CSU (the Bavarian partner of CDU) has the largest percentage of votes with rank 1 and
represents a majority in all the 95 of 95 questions.
4 Evaluation of coalitions
Table 3 displays all possible coalitions with two and three parties with their indices of
popularity and universality for unweighted questions. The first column contains the names
of parties which constitute the coalition. The second column shows the coalition size in
the total percentage of votes (= the percentage of parliament seats) with its ranking. For
example, the first two-party coalition SPD/CDU has the percentage of votes 34.2+35.2 =
69.4%.
The third column shows the degree of unanimity of the coalition, expressed in %
of questions on which all the member parties agree, also with a ranking. The follow-
ing coalitions have the highest unanimity: Green/Left-Party (rank 1, 81.1% = 78/95
questions), SPD/Green (rank 2, 73.7% = 70/95 questions), CDU/FDP (rank 3, 70.5%
= 67/95 questions), and SPD/Left-Party (rank 4, 66.3% = 63/95 questions). Then go
the triplet-coalition SPD/Green/Left-Party with rank 5 and unanimity 61.1% = 58/95
questions. The much discussed “Jamaica-coalition” CDU/Green/FDP (called so by its
black-green-yellow colors) agrees in 10.5% = 10/95 questions only and has rank 17.
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Table 2: Unweighted popularity and universality of parties and of DGB with ranks R of the German federal states (La¨nder)
SPD CDU Green FDP Left-Party Unions
Votes Popu-
larity
Univer-
sality
Votes Popu-
larity
Univer-
sality
Votes Popu-
larity
Univer-
sality
Votes Popu-
larity
Univer-
sality
Votes Popu-
larity
Univer-
sality
Popu-
larity
Univer-
sality
%/R %/R %/R %/R %/R %/R %/R %/R %/R %/R %/R %/R %/R %/R %/R %/R %/R
Baden-Wu¨rttemberg 30.1/13 64.6/15 52.6/9 39.2/2 67.8/2 91.6/2 10.7/4 52.0/15 36.8/8 11.9/1 55.1/2 78.9/1 3.8/14 46.7/15 31.6/8 52.1/15 35.8/7
Bayern 25.5/15 61.3/16 44.2/10 49.3/1 73.6/1 100.0/1 7.9/7 47.7/16 28.4/9 9.5/6 57.8/1 70.5/2 3.4/15 42.9/16 25.3/9 47.7/16 27.4/8
Berlin 34.4/9 71.7/3 97.9/2 22.0/15 53.9/15 46.3/9 13.7/3 64.0/1 75.8/3 8.2/9 43.8/15 33.7/8 16.4/6 60.8/4 68.4/4 64.4/2 78.9/2
Brandenburg 35.8/6 72.2/2 93.7/5 20.6/16 52.1/16 50.5/6 5.1/12 63.9/2 71.6/6 6.9/13 41.7/16 37.9/5 26.6/1 64.3/1 72.6/2 65.4/1 76.8/3
Bremen 43.0/2 74.5/1 98.9/1 22.8/14 55.6/12 45.3/10 14.3/2 63.3/3 74.7/4 8.1/10 45.0/12 34.7/7 8.3/7 57.9/6 67.4/5 64.0/3 80.0/1
Hamburg 38.7/4 71.2/4 94.7/4 28.9/11 59.5/9 49.5/7 14.9/1 60.1/6 78.9/1 9.0/7 48.0/9 36.8/6 6.3/8 54.4/9 65.3/6 60.4/7 75.8/4
Hessen 35.7/7 67.9/12 90.5/8 33.7/6 64.2/6 53.7/3 10.1/5 54.8/12 74.7/4 11.7/2 52.6/5 41.1/4 5.3/10 49.7/12 69.5/3 55.4/12 73.7/6
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 31.7/12 68.8/9 92.6/6 29.6/10 57.9/11 51.6/5 4.0/15 59.4/7 70.5/7 6.3/14 45.4/11 36.8/6 23.7/3 59.5/5 73.7/1 60.6/6 75.8/4
Niedersachsen 43.2/1 71.2/5 95.8/3 33.6/7 63.8/7 48.4/8 7.4/9 55.7/10 77.9/2 8.9/8 50.9/7 37.9/5 4.3/13 50.5/10 64.2/7 56.9/10 76.8/3
Nordrhein-Westfalen 40.0/3 69.6/7 91.6/7 34.4/5 64.4/5 52.6/4 7.6/8 54.9/11 73.7/5 10.0/5 51.9/6 42.1/3 5.2/11 50.0/11 68.4/4 55.9/11 74.7/5
Rheinland-Pfalz 34.6/8 66.5/13 52.6/9 36.9/3 66.5/3 91.6/2 7.3/10 52.5/14 36.8/8 11.7/2 54.2/3 78.9/1 5.6/9 47.9/14 31.6/8 53.2/14 35.8/7
Saarland 33.3/10 69.0/8 92.6/6 30.2/8 59.3/10 51.6/5 5.9/11 58.6/8 70.5/7 7.4/12 46.9/10 36.8/6 18.5/5 57.1/7 73.7/1 59.6/8 75.8/4
Sachsen 24.5/16 64.8/14 92.6/6 30.0/9 59.8/8 51.6/5 4.8/13 56.7/9 70.5/7 10.2/3 48.7/8 36.8/6 22.8/4 56.9/8 73.7/1 57.4/9 75.8/4
Sachsen-Anhalt 32.7/11 69.7/6 92.6/6 24.7/13 54.8/14 51.6/5 4.1/14 61.2/4 70.5/7 8.1/10 44.2/14 36.8/6 26.6/1 61.8/2 73.7/1 62.5/4 75.8/4
Schleswig-Holstein 38.2/5 68.5/11 90.5/8 36.4/4 65.5/4 53.7/3 8.4/6 54.1/13 74.7/4 10.1/4 52.6/4 41.1/4 4.6/12 49.1/13 69.5/3 54.9/13 73.7/6
Thu¨ringen 29.8/14 68.6/10 92.6/6 25.7/12 55.6/13 51.6/5 4.8/13 60.7/5 70.5/7 7.9/11 44.6/13 36.8/6 26.1/2 61.3/3 73.7/1 61.8/5 75.8/4
Whole of Germany 34.2 67.5 90.5 35.2 64.3 53.7 8.1 54.8 74.7 9.8 51.7 41.1 8.7 50.8 69.5 55.5 73.7
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Figure 4: Unweighted popularity of parties and of DGB in German federal states (La¨nder)
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Figure 5: Unweighted universality of parties and of DGB in German federal states
(La¨nder)
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On every question, the coalition members can either agree or disagree. In the first case
the coalition is unanimous and unambiguously represents the voters with the same opinion
(either Yes-Group, or No-Group). In the second case the coalition is not unanimous and
can come to any of alternative opinions. Usually, the impact of coalition members on final
coalition opinions is proportional to their weights (number of votes received). However,
such a proportionality holds only approximately.
In our model, the proportionality of impact to weights is described by a special pa-
rameter p. For example, let the weight ratio of parties within a coalition be 3 : 1. The
maximal respect to weight p = 1 means that the larger party determines the coalition
opinions with the proportional probability 3
4
, and the smaller party with probability 1
4
.
No respect to weight p = 0 means equal impact, so that each of alternative opinions
can be accepted by the coalition with probability 1
2
, regardless of member weights. The
intermediate case p = 1
2
corresponds to the impact probabilities 3
4
· 1
2
+ 1
2
· 1
2
= 5
8
and
1
4
· 1
2
+ 1
2
· 1
2
= 3
8
. In the paper p = 1
2
is accepted and applied to all coalitions considered.
Under the assumption, both indices of popularity and universality turn out to be
random variables. The coalition’s popularity is understood as the expected size of the
voter group represented. It is shown in the fourth column of Table 3, Expectation. The
prediction accuracy is specified in the fifth column of Table 3, Standard deviation (= square
root of the variance) of the size of the group represented. The highest popularity 65.9%
and the highest prediction accuracy (= lowest standard deviation) ±0.5% are inherent in
the coalition SPD/CDU, which is currently in power.
The next to last column of Table 3 contains the coalition universality understood as
the expected frequency of representing a majority. The last column shows the standard
deviation of the underlying random variable, characterizing the prediction accuracy. The
most universal coalition is SPD/Green with rank 1 with the expected universality 85.1%
and the second best prediction accuracy ±2.5% (rank 2).
The location of coalitions in the space Popularity–Universality–Unanimity is depicted
in Figure 6. As one can see, the coalitions differ in universality much more than in popu-
larity. The results of principle component analysis are shown in Table 4. Recall that this
type of analysis allows to approximate a cloud of observations with an ellipsoid, which
first diameter is the direction of the maximal variance, the second diameter is the second
maximal variance, etc. (Jackson 1988, Krzanowski 1988, and Seber 1984). The
contribution of universality absolutely predominates in the first two components. Conse-
quently, the universality can be regarded as a more decisive indicator than popularity.
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Table 3: Evaluation of coalitions for unweighted questions; the proportionality of impact
to weights p = 1
2
Nr. Coalition size Unanimity Popularity Universality
Expec-
tation
Stan-
dard
devia-
tion
Expec-
tation
Stan-
dard
devia-
tion
%/R %/R %/R %/R %/R %/R
1 SPD, CDU 69.4/4 44.2/6 65.9/1 ±0.5/1 72.0/6 ±3.8/6
2 SPD, Green 42.3/16 73.7/2 63.1/2 ±1.5/3 85.1/1 ±2.5/2
3 SPD, FDP 44.0/12 33.7/7 61.8/4 ±1.7/7 72.6/4 ±4.0/7
4 SPD, Left-Party 42.9/15 66.3/4 61.6/5 ±1.7/10 83.1/2 ±2.8/4
5 CDU, Green 43.3/14 28.4/8 61.0/7 ±1.5/5 60.9/12 ±4.1/8
6 CDU, FDP 45.0/11 70.5/3 59.8/10 ±1.7/8 49.2/20 ±2.7/3
7 CDU, Left-Party 43.9/13 25.3/9 59.6/11 ±1.7/11 59.2/14 ±4.2/9
8 Green, FDP 17.9/19 22.1/12 53.2/17 ±2.2/16 57.1/15 ±4.5/13
9 Green, Left-Party 16.8/20 82.1/1 52.8/18 ±1.3/2 72.1/5 ±2.2/1
10 FDP, Left-Party 18.5/18 18.9/13 51.2/20 ±2.4/19 54.8/18 ±4.6/17
11 SPD, CDU, Green 77.5/3 23.2/11 62.0/3 ±1.5/4 66.9/8 ±4.4/11
12 SPD, CDU, FDP 79.2/1 24.2/10 61.4/6 ±1.6/6 65.1/11 ±4.4/10
13 SPD, CDU, Left-Party 78.1/2 17.9/14 60.7/8 ±1.7/9 65.3/10 ±4.5/14
14 SPD, Green, FDP 52.1/8 14.7/15 58.1/13 ±2.1/14 68.1/7 ±4.5/12
15 SPD, Green, Left-Party 51.0/10 61.1/5 60.5/9 ±1.8/12 82.5/3 ±3.1/5
16 SPD, FDP, Left-Party 52.7/7 9.5/18 56.8/14 ±2.3/17 66.3/9 ±4.6/18
17 CDU, Green, FDP 53.1/6 10.5/17 56.7/15 ±2.2/15 54.9/17 ±4.6/16
18 CDU, Green, Left-Party 52.0/9 17.9/14 58.5/12 ±1.9/13 59.3/13 ±4.5/15
19 CDU, FDP, Left-Party 53.7/5 7.4/19 55.5/16 ±2.3/18 53.8/19 ±4.7/19
20 Green, FDP, Left-Party 26.6/17 11.6/16 51.4/19 ±2.4/20 56.6/16 ±4.8/20
Table 4: Principal component analysis of the “cloud of observations” of the 20 coalitions
in the space Popularity–Universality–Unanimity
Principle components
1st component 2nd component 3rd component (residual)
Popularity 0.0568 −0.2327 −0.9709
Universality 0.2677 −0.9333 0.2394
Unanimity 0.9618 0.2735 −0.0093
Standard deviation w.r.t. new axes 24.9417 8.3166 3.3827
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Some more details can be found in Figures 7–8 which show the coalitions in planes
Unanimity–Popularity and Unanimity–Universality. The prediction accuracy (standard
deviation) of the indicators is depicted by vertical grey segments. Note the location of
coalitions along the ascending diagonal, meaning that the higher the degree of unanimity,
the higher the indices of popularity and universality.
The coalition SPD/CDU (now in power) has a high popularity but a low degree
of unanimity and a mediocre universality. The coalition SPD/Green/Left-Party (much
discussed but not realized) has a higher degree of unanimity, somewhat lower popularity
but a much higher universality. The coalition CDU/FDP (which held before the elections)
has a higher degree of unanimity but relatively low indices of popularity and universality.
All of these show that the best would be likely the coalition SPD/Green/Left-Party
which failed due to personal conflicts between party leaders. One can only regret that
the politicians could not overcome personal prejudgements and did not think first about
their statesman duty to represent citizens.
5 Summary
1. (Initial data) The indices of popularity and universality of parties and their coali-
tions are derived from the results of the German parliament elections 2005 and party
manifestos.
2. (Indicators) These allow us to evaluate the representativeness of parties and of
the German Trade Union Federation (DGB), the degree of unanimity of coalitions
as well as to predict their performance.
3. (Most representative party) According to the quantitative analysis, the SPD
was the most representative German party at the time of the elections, although it
was not the election winner.
4. (Most representative coalition) The actual coalition in power, CDU/SPD, might
have a better alternative SPD/
Green/Left-Party if the politicians could surmount personal conflicts.
5. (Computational formulas) The vector-matrix computing formulas derived in the
next sections are easy to implement and provide a clear geometric interpretation of
interactions between the model elements.
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Figure 6: Location of coalitions in the space Popularity–Universality–Unanimity for un-
weighted questions; the proportionality of impact to weights p = 1
2
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Figure 7: Degree of unanimity versus popularity of coalitions for unweighted questions;
the proportionality of impact to weights p = 1
2
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
50
52
54
56
58
60
62
64
66
     
, Left−Party      , FDP      , Green                 , CDU                SPD 
Coalition’s degree of unanimity, in % of questions
Po
pu
la
rit
y 
of
 c
oa
lit
io
ns
 w
ith
 p
re
di
ct
io
n 
ac
cu
ra
cy
: s
ta
nd
ar
d 
de
vi
at
io
n 
of
 re
pr
es
en
ta
tiv
en
es
s (
ve
rti
ca
l in
ter
va
l),
 in
 %
1
2
3 4
5
67
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
1617
18
19
20
26
Figure 8: Degree of unanimity versus universality of coalitions for unweighted questions;
the proportionality of impact to weights p = 1
2
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6 Computational issues
This section introduces notation and formulas for evaluating parties and their coalitions.
Similar tasks of coalition analysis have been considered with the use of relational algebras
(Schmidt and Stro¨chlein 1993, Brink et al. 1997, de Swart et al. 2003, Berghammer et al.
2005, and Rusinowska et al. 2005). The vector-matrix formulas adduced below are much
simpler and have a clear geometric interpretation.
Questions/Agenda By Q denote the agenda with dichotomous questions q, that is,
which evoke either positive or negative opinions (Yes/No answers) coded by ±1. In our
applications, the list of m = 95 questions is given in the first column of Table 1.
The importance of questions is reflected by weights µq which constitute a probability
measure µ on Q (the reference to “probability” can be misleading; in fact, we just need a
normalized additive measure). It assumes
non-negativity
µq ≥ 0 for every q ∈ Q ,
additivity
µX =
∑
q∈X
µq for every subset X ⊂ Q ,
and normality ∑
q
µq = 1 (the totality is 100%) . (1)
The question weights are collected into the column m-vector
µ = {µq} .
In our application, “unweighted” means equal weights µq = 1/95. The non-normalized
expert weights and GOOGLE-weights are given in the last two columns of Table 1. To
fulfill the normalizing condition (1), divide each weight by the total of the 95 weights in
the given column.
Candidates Consider N candidates c for election; in our application the candidates are
N = 5 parties. Their positive or negative opinions bqc = ±1 on questions q are collected
into the (m×N)-matrix of candidate opinions derived from columns 2–6 of Table 14
B = {bqc}, bqc = ±1 .
4Comparing with (Tangian 2005), the matrix B is transposed.
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Balance of opinions in the society Consider the society of 45,430,368 voters for the
five leading parties, that is, 96% of all the 47, 287, 988 voters with the valid second vote
(for parties); see Bundeswahlleiter (2005). The 4% voters for other 19 minor parties
are not considered.
On each question q, the society falls into protagonists who answer the question posi-
tively, and antagonists who answer the question negatively. These groups, redefined for
each question, are shown in Figure 2, assuming that voters’ opinions are represented by
the parties.
On every question q, the balance of opinions aq is the predominance of protagonists
over antagonists, expressed in fraction (%) of the society. In Figure 2, it corresponds to
the difference between the length of the right-hand and left-hand rectangles. For example,
for question q = 1 (Relax the protection against dismissals?) we obtain
a1 =
Votes for
CDU︷ ︸︸ ︷
35.2 +
Votes for
FDP︷︸︸︷
9.8 −
Votes for
SPD︷ ︸︸ ︷
34.3 −
Votes for
Green︷︸︸︷
8.1 −
Votes for
Left-Party︷︸︸︷
8.7
35.2 + 9.8 + 34.3 + 8.1 + 8.7︸ ︷︷ ︸
Total votes for the five leading parties
= −0.0635 = −6.35% .
To facilitate computing, define the normalized vector of candidate weights, the coordinates
of which are proportional to percentages of votes for the five parties5
ξ = {ξc} =
(34.2, 35.2, 8.1, 9.8, 8.7)′
35.2 + 9.8 + 34.3 + 8.1 + 8.7
. (2)
The column 95-vector balance of opinions in the society is the matrix-vector product6
a = {aq} = Bξ . (3)
Popularity and universality of the candidates (parties) The representativeness
rqc of candidate c on question q is the size of the social group represented, measured in
fraction (percentage) of the society
rqc =
{
total weight of protagonists in the society if bqc = 1
total weight of antagonists in the society if bqc = −1
.
The popularity of candidate c is the weighted average of his representativeness (=
expected representativeness)
Pc =
∑
q
µq rqc (4)
5The figures in (2) are for the whole of Germany. For federal states use the voting results from Table 2.
6The balance of opinions in the society should be derived from individual opinions, as in (Tangian
2005). Here, the balance of opinions in the society is indirectly derived from the votes for candidates and
their opinions, because direct data on individual opinions are not available.
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The universality of candidate c is the weighted frequency with which he represents a
non-strict majority (= expected rounded representativeness):
Uc =
∑
q:rqc≥
1
2
µq =
∑
q
µq round[rqc] (5)
In a sense, the popularity reflects the spatial aspect of representativeness, and the
universality reflects its temporal aspect.
Computing the indicators and their geometrical interpretation Introduce the
following notation (all vectors are column vectors!):
′ the operation of vector/matrix transpose
. the operation of element-by-element product of vectors and matrices of the same size,
for example, (1, 2) . (3, 4) = (3, 8)
.2 the operation of element-by-element square of vectors and matrices, for example,
(2, 3).2 = (4, 9)
+ the addition of scalars to matrices or vectors by applying it to all matrix elements, for
example, 0.5 + (1, 2) = (1.5, 2.5)
diaga the diagonal (m×m)-matrix with elements of vector a on its main diagonal
signa the m-vector of majority opinions derived from the vector a by applying the sign
function to its coordinates
signaq =


+1 if aq > 0, i.e. the majority opinion on question q is positive
0 if aq = 0, i.e. tie opinion on question q
−1 if aq < 0, i.e. the majority opinion on question q is negative
δa = 1 − abs(signa) the m-vector of indicators of tie opinion, with the qth coordinate
being 1 if the opinion on question q is tied, and 0 otherwise; we use this vector to
express the total weight of questions with a tie opinion
µ′δa =
∑
q:aq=0
µq (6)
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Theorem 1 (Computing the indicators and their geometric interpretation)
R︸︷︷︸
(m×N)-matrix of
representativeness
of candidates c
on questions q
=
1
2
+
1
2
diaga︸ ︷︷ ︸
diagonal
(m×m)-matrix of
balance of opinions
in the society
B︸︷︷︸
(m×N)-matrix
of opinions
of candidates c
on questions q
(7)
{Pc}︸ ︷︷ ︸
row N-vector of
popularity of
all candidates c
= µ′R (8)
=
1
2
+
1
2
(
µ .a
)′
︸ ︷︷ ︸
µ-weighted
m-vector
of balance
of opinions
B︸︷︷︸
(m×N)-matrix
of opinions
of candidates c
on questions q
(9)
{Uc}︸ ︷︷ ︸
row N-vector of
universality of
all candidates c
= µ′round[R] (10)
=
1
2
+
1
2
µ′δa︸ ︷︷ ︸
total weight of
questions with
tie opinions
(constant scalar
independent of c)
+
1
2
(
µ . signa
)′
︸ ︷︷ ︸
µ-weighted
m-vector
of majority
opinion
B︸︷︷︸
(m×N)-matrix
of opinions
of candidates c
on questions q
, (11)
where the vector a is computed from (3).
Thus, the most popular (universal) candidate c has the largest projection of his opinion
vector bc (= the cth column of matrix B) on the µ-weighted social vector of balance of
opinions µ .a (respectively, on the µ-weighted vector of majority opinion µ . signa)7.
The formulas of the theorem are used to compute the indicators in Table 2 and for
Figures 3, 4, and 5.
Remark 1 (Analogy with force vectors in physics)
Recall that in mechanics a work is produced by displacements. Accordingly, the only
productive constituent of a force vector is its projection on the direction of motion. In
Theorem 1, the “work for the society” of a candidate is measured by the projection of his
opinion vector on the “main stream”, the social vector of balance of opinions, or social
vector of majority opinion. Thus the variety of representatives and representative bodies
with numerous opinions on the agenda is projected onto a single line axis, exactly like in
the case of physical forces.
7The popularity of candidate c is a bilinear form of social opinions a and candidate opinions bc (cth
column of matrix B). In our application, vectors a and matrix B are derived from candidate opinions,
reducing the bilinear form to quadratic.
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Evaluation of coalitions By definition, a coalition C is a subset of the set of candi-
dates. The coalition size is the total percentage of voters for all the candidates of the
coalition. For instance, the size of coalition C = SPD/CDU is 34.2 + 35.2 = 69.4%.
The (relative) weights of members of coalition C are collected in the normalized vector
C
ξ=
{
C
ξc=
ξc∑
c∈C ξc
, c ∈ C
}
.
The matrix of opinions of coalition members is the restriction of B to columns c ∈ C:
C
B= {bqc, c ∈ C} . (12)
The balance of opinions within coalition C is the vector
C
b=
{
C
bq
}
=
C
B
C
ξ . (13)
The (degree of) unanimity of coalition C is the total weight of the questions on which
the coalition members have equal positions. For instance, SPD and CDU agree in 42 of
95 questions, so that its unanimity is 44.2%.
If a coalition C is unanimous on question q its representativeness rqC is equal to that
of its every member. If the coalition is not unanimous, it can come to either positive, or
negative opinion on question q. We assume that on question q a coalition C represents
protagonists in the society with a probability ranging from the relative weight
C
ξ+q of
coalition protagonists to the absolute uncertainty 1
2
:
C
ξ+q p+
1
2
(1− p), 0 ≤ p ≤ 1 ,
where p denotes the proportionality of impact to weights of coalition members. If p = 1
the impact of coalition members is proportional to their weights. If p = 0 the coalition
comes to ±1 opinions with equal chances, so that both protagonists and antagonists in
the society are represented with equal probabilities 1
2
.
Under these provisions, the representativeness and the indicators of popularity and uni-
versality of a coalition are random variables which behavior for non-unanimous questions
depends on the parameter p. The popularity PC and universality UC of coalition C are
understood as its expected representativeness and expected rounded representativeness.
Besides, we compute the variance of representativeness and of rounded representativeness
as a measure of accuracy of the coalition indicators.
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Theorem 2 (Evaluation of coalitions)
Unanimity of C = 1− µ′
C
s (14)
PC = E rC = PC︸︷︷︸
=
∑
c∈C
C
ξc Pc
weighted
average
popularity
of coalition
members
−
1
2
(1− p)︸ ︷︷ ︸
impact of
uncertainty
(
µ .a
)′
︸ ︷︷ ︸
µ-weighted
m-vector
of balance
of opinions
(
C
s .
C
b
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
m-vector
of balance
of opinions
within the
coalition for
non-unanimous
questions
(15)
UC = E round[rC ] = UC︸︷︷︸
=
∑
c∈C
C
ξc Uc
weighted
average
universality
of coalition
members
−
1
2
(1− p)︸ ︷︷ ︸
impact of
uncertainty
(
µ . signa
)′
︸ ︷︷ ︸
µ-weighted
m-vector
of majority
opinion
(
C
s .
C
b
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
m-vector
of balance
of opinions
within the
coalition for
non-unanimous
questions
, (16)
where
C
s=
{
C
sq= sign
(
n−
∣∣∣∣∣∑
c∈C
bcq
∣∣∣∣∣
)}
, are indicators of the coalition non-unanimity on ques-
tions q, with n being the number of coalition members,
PC =
∑
c∈C
C
ξc Pc is the weighted average popularity of coalition members, and
UC =
∑
c∈C
C
ξc Uc is the weighted average universality of coalition members.
Besides, if the coalition opinions on non-unanimous questions are independent (= inde-
pendent negotiations on every question) then
V rC =
1
4
[
(µ .a) .2
]′ [C
s .
(
1− p2
C
b .2
)]
(17)
V round[rC ] =
1
4
[
(µ . signa) .2
]′ [C
s .
(
1− p2
C
b .2
)]
. (18)
The formulas of the theorem with p = 1
2
are used to compute indicators in Table 3
and for Figures 6, 7, and 8.
Remark 2 (Coalition indicators in the simplest case)
If p = 1 (the impact of coalition members is proportional to their weights) then by (15)
and (16) the popularity and universality of a coalition are equal to the weighted average
of corresponding indicators of its members: PC = PC and UC = PC .
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7 Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1
On every question q, obviously
The weight of non-strict majority/minority =
1
2︸︷︷︸
half
the
society
±
1
2
|aq|︸︷︷︸
predominance
of protagonists
over antagonists
.
Consequently, the representativeness of candidate c on question q is determined by the
the sign of his opinion and by the sign of aq
rqc =
1
2︸︷︷︸
half
the
society
+
1
2
aq︸︷︷︸
predominance
of protagonists
over antagonists
in the society
bqc︸︷︷︸
= ±1
opinion of
candidate c
, (19)
which matrix form is
R =
1
2
+
1
2
diagaB , (20)
as required in (7). Multiplying µ′ by (20), as required in the definition (4), obtain (8)
and (9):
{Pc} = µ
′R
= µ′

12


1
...
1

+ 12 diagaB


=
1
2
·
∑
q
µq︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
+
1
2
µ′diagaB
=
1
2
+
1
2
(µ .a)′B . (21)
To obtain (10), multiply µ′ by round[R], as required by definition (5). To obtain (11),
express the rounded representativeness of candidate c on question q by analogy with (19):
round[rqc] =
1
2
+
1
2
signaq bqc +
1
2
δaq︸︷︷︸
=
{
1 if aq = 0
0 if aq 6= 0
(22)
and proceed similarly to (21).
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Proof of Theorem 2
The unanimity of coalition members c ∈ C on question q means that either all bqc = 1,
or all bqc = −1, implying |
∑
c∈C bcq| = n, where n is the number of coalition members.
Consequently,
C
sq = sign
(
n−
∣∣∣∣∣∑
c∈C
bcq
∣∣∣∣∣
)
=
{
0 if c ∈ C are unanimous on question q
1 otherwise
(23)
1−
C
sq = 1− sign
(
n−
∣∣∣∣∣∑
c∈C
bcq
∣∣∣∣∣
)
=
{
1 if c ∈ C are unanimous on question q
0 otherwise
.(24)
Hence, the total weight of the questions on which the coalition is unanimous
Unanimity of C =
∑
q
µq
[
1− sign
(
n−
∣∣∣∣∣∑
c∈C
bcq
∣∣∣∣∣
)]
=
∑
q
µq︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
−µ′
C
s ,
as required in (14).
Compute the expectation and variance of representativeness rqC of a coalition C for a
given question q. Consider two cases.
• Coalition members are unanimous on question q. Express the coalition’s
representativeness by analogy with (19) and note that rqC is constant, implying
E rqC =
1
2
+
1
2
aq
C
bq︸︷︷︸
=±1 in case of unanimity
(25)
V rqC = 0 . (26)
• Coalition members are not unanimous on question q. The representativeness
rqC is a Bernoulli random variable, taking two values
1
2
± 1
2
aq with range |aq|. The
coalition can accept the opinion of majority in the coalition, or of its minority,
representing respectively the social groups with the size:
1
2
+
1
2
aq sign
C
bq with probability
(
1
2
+
1
2
∣∣∣∣∣Cbq
∣∣∣∣∣
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
majority in the coalition
p+
1
2
(1− p) (27)
=
1
2
+
1
2
∣∣∣∣∣Cbq
∣∣∣∣∣ p ,
1
2
−
1
2
aq sign
C
bq with probability
1
2
−
1
2
∣∣∣∣∣Cbq
∣∣∣∣∣ p . (28)
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By definition of expectation
E rqC =
1
4
[(
1 + aqsign
C
bq
)(
1 +
∣∣∣∣∣Cbq
∣∣∣∣∣ p
)
+
(
1− aqsign
C
bq
)(
1−
∣∣∣∣∣Cbq
∣∣∣∣∣ p
)]
=
1
2
+
1
2
aq sign
C
bq
∣∣∣∣∣Cbq
∣∣∣∣∣ p
=
1
2
+
1
2
aq
C
bq p . (29)
By the known formula for the variance of Bernoulli random variables (Korn and
Korn 1968, Table 18.8.3, case n = 1, Abramowitz and Stegun 1972, 26.1.20, case
n = 1) obtain
V rqC = a
2
q
(
1
2
+
1
2
∣∣∣∣∣Cbq
∣∣∣∣∣ p
)(
1
2
−
1
2
∣∣∣∣∣Cbq
∣∣∣∣∣ p
)
=
1
4
a2q

1−
(
C
bq
)2
p2

 . (30)
Compute the popularity PC of a coalition C. Using (25) and (29) and applying (23)–
(24) as indicators of (non-) unanimity, obtain
PC = E rC =
∑
q unanimous
µq
(
1
2
+
1
2
aq
C
bq
)
+
∑
q non-unanimous
µq
(
1
2
+
1
2
aq
C
bq p
)
=
∑
q
µq
(
1−
C
sq
)(
1
2
+
1
2
aq
C
bq
)
+
∑
q
µq
C
sq
(
1
2
+
1
2
aq
C
bq p
)
Identity
=⇒
=
∑
q
µq
(
1
2
+
1
2
aq
C
bq
)
−
1
2
(1− p)
∑
q
µqaq
C
sq
C
bq
by (12)
=⇒ (31)
=
∑
q
µq
(
1
2
∑
c∈C
C
ξc︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
+
1
2
aq
∑
c∈C
C
ξc bqc
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸∑
c∈C
C
ξ c
∑
q
µq(
1
2
+ 1
2
aqbqc)
by (4) and (19)
=
∑
c∈C
C
ξcPc
−
1
2
(1− p)
∑
q
µqaq
C
sq
C
bq
=
∑
c∈C
C
ξc Pc︸ ︷︷ ︸
PC
−
1
2
(1− p)(µ .a)′
(
C
s .
C
b
)
,
as required in (15).
Compute the universality UC of a coalition C. If aq = 0 (tie opinion on question q
in the society) the rounded representativeness round[rC ] = round[
1
2
] = 1. If aq 6= 0, by
analogy with (27)–(28), the rounded representativeness of coalition C takes values
1
2
+
1
2
signaq sign
C
bq with probability
1
2
+
1
2
∣∣∣∣∣Cbq
∣∣∣∣∣ p ,
1
2
−
1
2
signaq sign
C
bq with probability
1
2
−
1
2
∣∣∣∣∣Cbq
∣∣∣∣∣ p .
36
Applying the indicator of tie opinion (6) and proceeding like in (29) and (31) obtain
UC = E round[rC ]
=
∑
q:aq=0
µq · 1 +
∑
q:aq 6=0
µq
(
1
2
+
1
2
signaq
C
bq
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸∑
c∈C
C
ξ cUc
−
1
2
(1− p)
∑
q:aq 6=0
µq signaq
C
sq
C
bq
︸ ︷︷ ︸∑
q
µqsignaq
C
sq
C
bq
= UC −
1
2
(1− p)(µ . signa)′
(
C
s .
C
b
)
,
as required in (16).
Compute the variance of representativeness rqC of coalition C. Using (26) and (30),
applying (23)–(24) as indicators of (non-)unanimity, and taking into account that the
variance of a sum of independent random variables is the sum of their variances, obtain
V rC =
∑
q
µ2q
(
1−
C
sq
)
· 0 +
∑
q
µ2q
C
sq
1
4
a2q

1− p2
(
C
bq
)2 Identity=⇒ (32)
=
1
4
[
(µ .a) .2
]′ [C
s .
(
1− p2
C
b .2
)]
,
as required in (17).
The derivation of the variance for the rounded representativeness round[rqC ] of coali-
tion C is similar to (32), but there are two changes to be made:
• The range of the Bernoulli random variable round[rqC ] is 1 instead of |aq|, con-
sequently, a2q in (32) should be replaced by 1.
• If aq = 0 in (32), that is, tie opinion in the society on question q, then rqC =
1
2
,
implying round[rqC ] = round[
1
2
] = 1. Hence, V round[rqC ] = 0. The variances for
such questions q should be nullified by the multiplier (signaq)
2 which retains all
other terms intact.
Thus,
V round[rC ] =
1
4
[
µ.2 . (signa) .2
]′ [C
s .
(
1− p2
C
b .2
)]
,
as required in (18).
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